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I'm sorry for the short notice of this meeting but it
seemed to us not quite proper to decide to call a press meeting
unless and until we had the meeting ^with the President/7 and it
was reasonable to do so. There were really two meetings this
morning. I met privately with the President for about 15
minutes so that I could have an opportunity to discuss .the
status and the nature of the program and where I felt we were
going, privately, before briefing him and seeing his staff
members and his staff about the program and its status and
where we're going. I think the principal point that I would
like to make is that the President made a firm and definite
statement of support and confidence in the program and his
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determination to continue it and to bring it into operation
as we have planned.
For a variety of reasons, because of his interest in it
as a vehicle for scientific and technological progress,
because of its defense importance, its importance to our
commercial utilization of space, and its importance as an
example and a symbol of U.S. technological progress, we
discussed in the briefing the various aspects of the program,
its technical state, its managerial questions. This was not
a budget discussion, so we did not have detailed discussion
of financial aspects. We discussed the prospective schedule,
and the way in which it fits, and in some ways does not com-
pletely fit, commercial needs; the way in which it fits DOD
requirements; and discussed the whole question of my informing
him and my access to him with regard to any questions that may
arise as we get close to launch.
On the technical points—the main point that I wanted to
make, and I think everyone agreed with, is that at this point
the problems and difficulties that we are having are what I
would regard as the normal end of large technological program
difficulties. We are not having—as far as anyone who has
looked at the program can tell—major central technical
-3-
problems. I characterized them to the President as being
technological odds and ends. Things that break, things that
need redesign—but basically small problems, but a tight and
complex system; problems which must be fixed and the fixing
of which causes delay and time problems, and time problems
are money problems.
With regard to managerial problems, I outlined some of
the managerial changes we have been making which I think you
are familiar with from previous reports and principally, in
 ;---
particular, the splitting of the responsibilities for the
Space Transportation System between an acquisition portion
and an operations portion, so that John Yardley will have
additional time and effort on the acquisition and we can con-
tinue and enhance the preparation for an operating system.
With regard to schedule, you see the chart on the easel which
was used in the briefing. The upper part deals with the
actual processing of the parts of the vehicle leading to launch.
The lower portion deals with flight certification, that is the
testing and qualification of additional individual portions
and systems in the overall system so that they can be certified
for flight.
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The "key points are that the orbiter must complete its
manufacture and checkout, the solid motor must have its fourth
test, the external tank is about to complete its certification,
the orbiter systems are about three-quarters of the way through
certification.
We would then hope to bring the orbiter out and mate it
with the stacked solid motors and external tank around March;
then take it to the pad for launch preparation, that is to
say put it on the pad and go through the complete set of
electrical, electronic and mechanical checkout prior to launch;
some time in May have a test firing, a flight readiness firing,
which would be a short firing to check the liquid engines and
all systems but not firing the solid rocket boosters; depending
on how successful that was, then be able to proceed to launch
as early as the end of June. The hashed lines indicate that,
of course, there are possibilities for other problems and for
delay. We would say now, I think, that while June is a
possible launch date, some time in August, September is a
much more likely launch date and what we think most likely to
happen, although we are working to June as a schedule matter.
It looks as though the principal remaining problems have to do
with the certification through testing of the main engine
systems. My earlier statement applies to that, namely we are
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having odds and ends of problems, but in a complex system
like that engine,' all those problems must be cleared up and
each such problem leads to some kind of time in order to do
that.
The other comment that the President made with regard to
the approach to flight is that as we get close to the flight,
he would like to be kept informed of any significant points
i
of progress, change, or difficulty, and that I am to do that
either in the normal ways, or if necessary in my judgment, to
talk with him directly, and personally.. I think those are the
principal points. I would be happy to respond to questions.
(END OF OPENING STATEMENT)
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Q.: Rebecca Sobel, and I'm with NBC. Could you tell us
what is the condition of the tiles. I understand there was a
problem with them?
FROSCH: The problems with the tiles had to do with some
problems of strength of the tile system as glued on the orbiter
and it is induced by some of the problems in the way the tiles
get glued to an isolation pad and that gets glued to the orbiter.
In order to be sure that we have the adequate strength, we are •
now proceeding to pull test, that is to pull on each tile of--'
the crucial high temperature tiles with a sufficient pull so
that we are beyond what is required with a margin of safety.
As we expected in this test, we are pulling some of the tiles
off. We have a certified procedure for increasing the strength
of those tiles and reapplying them. So far in the pull tests
done to date, we've got about 11 to 12 per cent failure of the
tiles. That is, at this over stress, we are actually pulling
about that percentage off, and they will need to be treated
and reapplied. That now appears to us to be a process that
we can carry out—provided this failure rate at overstress
continues at about the same percentage—that we will be able
to carry that out and complete it in time for the orbiter to
leave roughly on the—leave its processing roughly on the
!-7-
schedule described there, so that is not likely in our view
to be the pacing .-item in the first flight schedule.
Q.: /Sobel/: I have another question, if I may. How
much will this cost now? Did the President indicate anything
about an increase in funds and indicate how he will convince
Congress to appropriate these funds?
FROSCH: The President made it clear that he is aware
that this will, this whole process will cost additional funds
over what was programmed when the '80 budget went in both in
V'
terms of 1980 Supplemental and increased request in the '81
budget. We did not, since it was not a budget meeting, discuss
the precise amount, that is being worked out in the normal
process with the Office of Management and Budget and will be
presented to the President as part of the budget discussions
/
sometime later this fall, but it has already been announced
- • - - . - • ^
that it is the President's intention, if required—and we
believe it will be—to send up with the 1981 budget a supple-
mental for 1980 to add the funds that are required to carry
us through 1980—Fiscal 1980—with the additional delays.
Q.: /Sobel7: Dr. Frosch, do you have any idea how much
this whole thing is going to cost, any general idea that you
can give us?
• Jt
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FROSCH: I don't want to talk about 1980 or '81 budget
not at this point. I have testified that the additional
funding in 1980 will be in the order of several hundred
million dollars.
Q.: Is this the third supplemental or the second?
FROSCH: There was a supplemental in 1979, there was an
amendment to the '80 budget and there will be a supplemental
to the '80 budget. So it is the second supplemental, the
other being an amendment. . .^..
Q.: /Silverstone?7: Dr. Frosch, you mentioned your having
odds and ends problems with the main engines, I guess over a
week ago you failed to fire the main engine and there has been
no test of all those three engines fired successfully for the
duration required. Have you completed a damage assessment of
that incident at the Space Technology Lab and are you in a
position to say how much that engine incident will add to the
slippage in the schedule?
FROSCH: Two points: One, there has been a 90-second
test of all three engines fired—100-seconds. I describe this
as odds and ends because they do not appear to be central,
intrinsic problems but rather failures, occasional failures,
of particular parts—in this case a failure of a seal in the
high pressure oxygen turbopump and concommitant to the shutdown,
a failure in the piping that conducts liquid hydrogen for
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cooling through the nozzle, this was on a different engine than
the one on which""the seal failed and it appears that that is
connected with some kind of a defective manufacture of the
part. The problem with the seal has not really been diagnosed,
but it is the second time over a fairly long period that we
have had a problem with that particular seal so there may be
a design problem to be fixed there. However, I would say at
this point that we do not have a complete diagnosis of either
of those. We are just in the process of having the parts out
and being looked at carefully. We know now that we will in
any case not be back up for main propulsion tests before
sometime in December so that is a delay of perhaps six weeks
or thereabouts.
Q.: Craig Covault: Bob, you've gotten an $85 million
addition and a $220 million addition, and the Administration
has expressed its willingness to give you about $300 million
in '80 extra, that's pretty strong support voiced right there
i
over the past six months. I'm not sure I understand the real
significance over the meeting today. Could you perhaps speak
to, maybe from a big picture/ the significance of bringing
Office of Management and Budget into a more, giving them a
more appreciative mind set of what it takes to build a program
like this? Do you think you've got that now?
1-10-
PROSCH: I think its fairly clear that we have the support
of OMB at this point and have had for about—I don't know—
since last spring, six or eight months. At any rate, it was
clear that they did appreciate what kind of problem we had
and what needed to be done about it. I can't say that I am
sure that everybody who is watching the program and agreeing
understands in detail what the nature of the problem is, but
I think they do understand where we are trying to go, and why
it is worth it.
Q.: Bill Hines of the Chicago Sun Times: In the report
that the three advisers sent to you in October, Bill Anders,
who flew on Apollo 8, said that the margin of safety in the
first earth orbital Apollo flight in 1980 is in his mind smaller
than the margin of safety on the Apollo 7—I meant the orbiter,
the first orbiter flight in '80—is smaller than the margin for
safety in Apollo 7 that he flew in 1968. Did you discuss with
him what he had in mind specifically and what does this tell
us about this program?
FROSCH: I did talk to Bill Anders about that, and what
he said was the following: The way he put it to me was, "I
would certainly fly the first Shuttle flight, but I would feel
that it was a little riskier than I felt Apollo 8 was." And
he said the reason really is that the Shuttle is more like
^^ '^ i^ ^^
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testing an aircraft in the overall design philosophy and
test philosophy than testing the Apollo spacecraft. And there
are certain differences. There were unmanned launches of
Apollo spacecraft before the manned launches, we are not doing
that in the Shuttle program. It is more difficult considerably
to do that with such a program and furthermore our conclusion
is that that would be less safe and would not increase the
safety of the first flight to try that. I think it was a
kind of marginal comment having to do with his feeling of comfort
with it. We have tried to go back and see if we can put any
quantitative or more qualitative, more detailed qualitative
feeling to that—whether we can make a comparison. And I
guess we come out saying perhaps it looks to us that the
Shuttle looks a little bit more like testing the X-15 in its
era than it does testing Apollo in its era. But if you look
at factors of safety and nature of testing and so on, it's a
little bit difficult to tell very much difference objectively.
And certainly for certain parts of Apollo there was less
redundancy than we have for certain parts of Shuttle. Some of
the return engines, for example, were reuses with single string
and no redundancy. We don't really know how to evaluate that
in a quantitative manner.
f H-51g.
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Q.: Raines/: Let me just follow up because you in your
response you said' something that was interesting. You said
that doing an unmanned launch with the Shuttle would be more
difficult, indeed would it be possible to fly a complete
Shuttle profile without men in the cockpit?
FROSCH: Well, I think we would agree that in principle
we would know how to do that in the sense that there is an
effectively automatic mode and there is software that can do
the whole thing. But the idea of taking the thing off and
launching it unmanned with the additional avionics we would
have to put in and running it remote or fully automatic does
not seem to us to be a very reasonable thing to do and we
would have to do considerably more outfitting of the system
than we have now—and it just seems as though it would add a
good deal of risk to first flight without having us learn very
much more.
John, you want to add something?
YARDLEY: Let me add just one thing, Bill. You might
compare^Tt to taking a 747 on its maiden.flight and making a
category 3 landing. That's what you would have to do with the
Shuttle, and that is a big difference between Apollo, Gemini
and Mercury—the landing.
^^ J^fc-^ ^^ S^ a^ e,^
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FROSCH: I would like to make one other point while we
are on this, and"that is that we are not working to schedule.
We are trying to make a schedule, but we are working to a safe
first launch, using the kinds of formal procedures and criteria
that we have used before, and that will really govern the first
launch when we are ready for it.
Q.: Robert Toth, Los Angeles Tiroes: That brings up the question
of the schedule. I wonder if you could address the problems
of your customers, both DOD and commercial. Have any of them
sort of fled because of the slippages? There is talk about
keeping open expendable booster lines and of going to the
Europeans.
FROSCH: Let me take DOD first. The most critical DOD
launches come in '83 and '84, first most critical ones, and
there appears to us and .to DOD to be enough time between the
current stage of the schedule and when we need to have orbiters
102, 099 and 103 ready for East Coast and West Coast launches,
so that from that point of view the exact date of first flight
and the initial capability for DOD are hot so tightly coupled.
There is time in there. The situation is different for the
commercial customers, who are some of them already being impacted
t>y shifts in the operational schedule date, due to the delays in
first launch. We have had for quite some time—several years—
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a possibility for a user of the Shuttle in the early years to,
in effect, buy insurance by requesting a backup. Normally,
it is a Delta launch vehicle for most of the commercial
items. Under an arrangement where the user has to inform us
his choice between Shuttle and Delta backup within 30 days
after first launch, and then if he chooses the Delta backup,
to start paying for that launch vehicle. We have met with
the users to discuss the current status and the new manifest
schedule, there may be a requirement for an additional numbejr
of users to back themselves up with additional Delta launch
i
vehicles and some of them may require an upgraded version of
the Delta, and we are now exploring with them whether there
are enough users who want that upgraded insurance so that
it is a sensible proposition to get that vehicle upgraded
and buy a limited number of them. There are some users who
have been looking at the question of whether they will be
forced to use the European launch vehicle Ariane. There was
another interesting aspect to the meeting with the users,
and that is that they generally expressed the view that between
now and 1985 no matter what we did with regard to Shuttle
launches and Delta launches and Ariane, that we would very
likely from their view be in a situation in which the free
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world was short of launch capability. This was rather a new
note, and I have ..asked them to see if there is some way in
which they can provide us with reasonably hard industry data
to make this case, because it wasn't clear to them or to us
that there had been sufficient knowledge among them of each
others' programs so that they were not citing a situation
in which there was considerable overlap in what they thought
the market was. But I am hoping to get a clearer idea of that
/Inaudible question/:
 x>
FROSCH: I would say it was expressed strongly by four
or five of those who were there and generally agreed to by
the others.
Q.: Anne Groer, Orlando Sentinel: It was reported in
Florida today that the first orbiter is severely overweight
and may be grounded after only four flights and not make the
anticipated hundred flights. So the first question is will
you confirm that and the second question is did you make a'
pitch to the President for a fifth orbiter?
FROSCH: No and No. The first orbiter is heavier than
we expect the second, third, and fourth to be-but the
distribution of payload weights, as we see them now in the
manifest, is such that by assigning payloads and flights and
launch sites to appropriate orbiters, we would not now expect
that we would do anything but keep 102 in the operational
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system—that is the plan for that to be one of the four
operating orbiter.s. 101, of course, has not been intended
to be a flight orbiter for some time now. We did not raise
the question of a fifth orbiter at this meeting with the
President.
Q.: Craig Covault, Aviation Week: Two questions.
Is your August/September your fifty/fifty now, or is that
your 90 percent?
FROSCH: I think that's the fifty/fifty, or whatever
v"
that means.
Q.: /Covault/: And the second question, four or five
weeks ago, I believe, or thereabouts, you sent your report
to the President and told him about your management changes
in the agency. Are you yourself satisfied with the progress
of that; is it just on paper or is it actually functional,
and along with that, did the President comment to you about
his impressions of those changes?
FROSCH: It is getting to be functional, there is a
question of filling certain key slots which doesn't get done
instantly. We have begun to operate in that mode even though
not all the formal paperwork is completed. The President did
not discuss the details of that management system with me
particularly. I re-outlined it to him; he was concerned to
.;!
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be certain that I myself would be current in detail on what
was happening in the program as I was faced with decisions
and we discussed that somewhat.
Q.: Howard Benedict, AP: Did you get the impression
from the President that if you came in with say a $300 million
request for supplemental for 1980 that you would get the full
amount?
FROSCH: I have the impression that he is prepared for
that possibility and includes it in his expression of support.
Q.: /Covault7: Bob, on the hill the other day, you
discussed the possibility of maybe requesting that extra money
a little earlier than along with the fiscal '81 request? Has
that decision changed?
FROSCH: This situation has not changed.
Q. : /Tothj7: I'm curious about an earlier question that
was asked about what really was the significance and purpose
of the meeting? Was it a kind of Presidential vote of con-
fidence, given the problems you've been having with the
Shuttle,.or was there something else that escapes us?
FROSCH: Well, I think it came out as a Presidential
vote of confidence given the problems, but, as you will recall,
a while ago the President asked me to get some outside
consultants to assist in an evaluation of where we were
>1
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managerially and otherwise, and asked for a report from me to
him including those consultant reports, and at that time it
had been set up that we would report to him personally some
time in November. So that it could have been any kind of
conclusion depending on his evaluation of that report and the
state of affairs. As it has come out, it has been an expression
of confidence.
Q.: /Mines/: Now I'm not suggesting for a moment that
the Space Shuttle is a disaster of the magnitude of Three
Mile Island, but I wonder have you ever considered whether
it would be helpful or hurtful perhaps to have a completely
unbiased outside Presidential Commission like the Kemeny
Commission to look into this whole thing and render a report
on the program? You had a few in-house reports and semi-
out-house reports but—a completely unaffiliated commission
to review your programs?
FROSCH: I don't think that this is anywhere near the
state of a problem that requires that kind of examination.
As I compare it to other large technical programs I've seen
both in terms of the fiscal problems considered in terms of
percentages and the time problems considering the complexity,
it is not having extraordinary difficulty. I think it is
fairly normal. Even lots of small scale ones that I have been
involved with have had this kind of problem.
y^y*^ ?^
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Q.: /Hines?: Name a couple of them, please.
FROSCH: Well, I could go through a long list of Navy
programs that I've been involved with. Al says the Monitor
and Merrimac. It certainly goes back that far. But look at
any random handful of complex weapons systems, and you find
some that come on time and some that are much worse than this.
This is about par. There is an interesting paper that Norm
Augustine wrote in the spring issue of Defense Management
Review in which he has been collecting statistics for years,
and he's got a fascinating graph of the time it will actually
take you to complete the program from any particular moment
graphed against the time you think it will take you to complete
the program and he's fitted a regression line to it which has
a slope of 1.33. There is some other interesting data in that.
/inaudible question/7-:
FROSCH: That's what he gets out of a lot of interesting
data.
Q.: Jonathan Mill, Satellite Week: I wonder if you
happen to be watching television the other night where there
was a discussion of anti-satellite weapons and the fact that
the Soviets may consider the Shuttle to be an anti-satellite
weapon of the sort? Is there any consideration being given
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by NASA to protecting this asset for national security from
hostile action against it when it is in service?
FROSCH: I did see the program. No, we are not doing
any particular, special protective measures other than
reasonable prudent ones having to do with privacy of communica-
tions up and down, when necessary, and related matters.
Obviously we will keep in mind the question of attack. But
its, I think, everyone's view that an attack on the Shuttle
would not be a minor incident to be regarded in a mild way.
That would clearly be a major event and we do not expect such a
thing to happen.
Let me add one other comment with regard to the question
of the Shuttle or anything else as an ASAT. In my view, any
launch vehicle that can put something in orbit can in principle
be used that way. There is nothing particularly occult about
the Shuttle from that point of view.
Q.: Dr. Frosch, Rebecca Sobel from NBC, and I'm not here
because RCA wants to know when their equipment will get up.
FROSCH: They do, they do—they call regularly.
Q.: /Sobel/: I know, I know. There has also been some
question about space stations. Are there any plans that are
moving ahead?
wp^ ffj^ ^
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FROSCH: We do not have current plans for a space station.
Q.: /SobeJL7: And my other question is why not?
FROSCH: Several reasons, one, we're not really at the
point where we would plan that sensibly til we have got the
Shuttle operating. Second is, it is not so clear to us what
we would design such a thing for. I think it more likely that
we will evolve through operations into a requirement for such
a thing. But I will say that we are not totally absent of
thinking on the subject. While we have no program and we have
no formal system operation now for a permanent station or a
long-term station, obviously we have people in NASA who are
thinking about this, and in the long-term planning it may begin
to turn up. What we're really depending on in the early period
is the use of the Spacelab in the Shuttle; as what amounts to a
short-term space station, manned, people doing experiments in
it, playing that function, and that will do some of that work
for periods up to seven days when we get some power enhancement
systems for periods longer than seven days and will probably
i
teach us a good deal that we want to know about why and how and
what to do in a more permanent station.
Q.: Just one last question if I may. I know you don't
want to predict what the 1980 supplemental monies might be,
jdiffj.tfriy^
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but could you tell me, beside that—$300 million or whatever
it would be—what has the program cost, then, until now?
FROSCH: I think I have some numbers on that. I can tell
it to you only cause I have it in front of me that way. In
1971 dollars, not in real years dollars—inflated—because I
have it in front of me that way. And we usually quote numbers
in that way because that was the way the original agreement was
made, so we quote it in that way, and then it can be inflated
however the dollars have inflated. And in '71 dollars funded
through fiscal year '79, not with what has been spent in '80,
the development cost has been $5.29 billion. I don't know what
that scale is, Bill do you have an idea? Probably about 8,
total in real year dollars. The $5.29 billion in fiscal '71
we'd have to compute, but it's probably about 8 billion in
real year dollars. That's as compared to the 1972 estimate
for the development that was $5.15 billion. Now the facilities
.costs so far, and again in '71 dollars is $262 million, "and we
have invested in the fleet beyond the development so far
287 million in '71 dollars.
Q.: Howard Benedict, AP: If it weren't for the national
defense aspects of the Shuttle, do you think you would have
gotten the Presidential support today?
'
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FROSCH: The President expressed his support as including
a number of aspects beyond and in addition to the national
defense requirements—scientific, commercial, U.S. position
in space, and so on. I always find it difficult to speculate
what would have happened if. I think there is no question
that the national defense requirement adds a good deal to the
urgency.
SHAFER: Craig Covault—this will be the last question
here, Bob.
Q.: For the last several months,, your program offices have
been very concerned about Shuttle needs pulling money away from
their other program needs, Space Science, Applications, so
forth. Although today wasn't a budget meeting, is your overall
impression that the favorable response at the White House that
you're getting a need for more Shuttle money will spread to the
$5.69 or $9.6 billion whatever your request is in '81 for new
starts in the basic budget you have requested across the board?
FROSCH: I think all I would say now is that it is my
impression that there is a recognition that it is probably
not possible to preserve the civil space program policy of the
President in a proper manner if all of the additional Shuttle
money were to come out of the rest of the program. I think
that is not really going to happen. But, as for what really
will happen in the budget discussions, I can't say yet.
-24-
Aside from anything else, they haven't really happened.
SHAFER: Bob
Q.: /Toth/: Just a minor point, in your testimony of
October 18 you used the figure 6 billion in equivalent dollars
compared to the original figure 5.15 (cut?).
FROSCH: Answering a different question. What I was
answering then was a prediction as to the VI dollar equivalent
cost of development at completion, and that number we would
give now as about 6.1 billion—about the same as it was then.
And so that's how you then figured it's going to be twenty
percent higher than usual. That's where the ratio came from.
SHAFER: All right, thank you all very much. A reminder
that if you'll leave your name and address on an envelope at
the rear of the room.
-end-
